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Who Controls Our Continuing Medical Education?:
The Shortcomings of the Current CME Regulation
Regime and How to Reform It
James J. Hennelly*
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuing medical education (CME) helps healthcare professionals in
the United States keep their knowledge and skill sets up to date so they can
provide the best possible care, improve patient outcomes, and protect
patient safety through presentations and discussions on specific treatments
and developments in medicine.' In its current state, however, it does not
achieve this goal.2 The Institute of Medicine (IOM) has accused
pharmaceutical and medical device companies of financing CME delivery,
influencing it solely to increase their market shares.3
Because of growing criticism of the influence of pharmaceutical and
medical device manufacturers on CME, the industry has cut back its
support to accredited CME providers in recent years. For example, Pfizer
and GlaxoSmithKline, two of the largest drug manufacturers in the world,
announced in 2008 and 2009, respectively, that they would no longer
provide money to for-profit CME providers. The trend of diminishing
commercial support has continued: 2012 marked the sixth consecutive year
of declining financial support for CME. Industry contributions in 2012
decreased 10.3% from 2011.5 This accounted for approximately 27% of
* J.D., American University Washington College of Law, 2013; B.A., Washington
University in St. Louis, 2010.
1. INST. OF MED., SUMMARY: REDESIGNING CONTINUING EDUCATION IN THE HEALTH
PROFESSIONS 3 (Nancy Adler & Susanne Stoiber eds., 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 4.
4. See Ed Silverman, Pfizer Ending Support for CME by Third Parties
(July 2, 2008, 11:05AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/07/pfizer-ending-support-for-
cme-by-third-parties/; Press Release, GlaxoSmithKline, GSK Limits Medical Education
Funding to Independent Programs with Highest Impact on Patient Care (Sept. 21, 2009),
http://us.gsk.com/html/media-news/pressreleases/2009/2009_us-pressrelease_10062.htm.
5. ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING MED. EDUC., ACCME ANNUAL REPORT-
2012 10 (2013), available at http://www.accme.org/sites/default/files/630_2012_Annual
Report 20130724_2.pdf; see also Ed Silverman, Commercial Support for CME Dives, Again
(July 30, 2012, 9:09:AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2012/07/commercial-support-for-cme-
dives-again/ (noting that CME income fell 1.1% in 2011 from 2010, and the number of
1
1
Hennelly: Who Controls Our Continuing Medical Education?: The Shortcomings
Published by LAW eCommons, 2014
Vol 23, 2014 Annals of Health Law 2
CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION
CME providers' total income, opposed to over 50% in 2007.6 Institutions
provided 82% of CME without commercial support. The drop in
commercial support is not necessarily attributable only to industry restraint.
Many factors have influenced the decline, including a weak national
economy, a slowing pharmaceutical pipeline, more rigorous Accreditation
Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) guidelines, and a
general growing criticism of industry-funded CME.8 ACCME is the body
responsible for accrediting institutions offering CME, developing criteria
for evaluation of CME, and reviewing developments in CME's support of
quality healthcare.9 Despite the existence of ACCME Standards for
Commercial Support, which set forth restrictions on how industry can
provide funding to CME providers, they do not go far enough in
minimizing industry influence on CME programs.1 o
While the recent decrease in industry support for CME results in
decreased conflicts of interest, it has not eliminated industry influence over
CME delivery. While the federal Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) has traditionally left the regulation of CME activity to the
ACCME, ACCME has been lax in enforcing its own accreditation
standards." As a result, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
providers dropped to 687 from a peak of 736 in 2007). Interestingly, commercial support for
CME provided by medical schools has not decreased as sharply, though several medical
schools have begun to adopt policies that shy away from industry funding. See Natasha
Singer & Duff Wilson, Debate Over Industry Role in Educating Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, June
23, 2010, at Bl. The University of Michigan, for example, decided in 2010 that it would no
longer accept money from drug and device manufacturers to fund CME activities. Id.
6. See ACCME ANNUAL REPORT-2012, supra note 5, at 10.
7. Id. at 35.
8. Kevin B. O'Reilly, As CME Funding Shifts from Industry, Others Foot the Bill,
AMERICAN MEDICAL NEws (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.amednews.com/article/20110912/
profession/309129948/2/.
9. Accreditation Council for Continuing Med. Educ., About Us, http://www.accme.org/
about-us (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
10. See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING MED. EDUC., THE ACCREDITATION
REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION
(ACCME), 1 (2012) [hereinafter ACCME STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT],
available at http://www.accme.org/sites/default/files/626_AccreditationRequirements
Document_20120924.pdf; see, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 1; Marc A. Rodwin, Drug
Advertising, Continuing Medical Education, and Physician Prescribing: A Historical Review
and Reform Proposal, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 807, 811 (2010).
11. See, e.g., Senate Special Committee on Aging Committee Hearing, INFOTECH NEWS
(July 30, 2009) [hereinafter Nissen Testimony], http://it.tmcnet.com/news/2009/07/30/4301
036.htm (recounting Steven Nissen, MD, Chairman, Department of Cardiovascular
Medicine, Cleveland Clinic's testimony to the Senate's Special Committee on Aging,
including that the ACCME's enforcement is "largely ineffective," as the organization seems
"uninterested or incapable of enforcing" its own policies); Nissen Puts Stake Through
ACCME's Heart at Senate Hearing on Industry-Funded CME, PHARMA MARKETING
2
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(CMS) recently promulgated rules under the Physician Payments Sunshine
Act that require full disclosure of any industry payments to physicians
through CME activities.12 However, the regulations exempt indirect
payments made by industry players to accredited CME providers from the
reporting requirements, creating a means for industry to avoid disclosure of
payments made.13 This has reignited the debate about Industry influence
over CME delivery.
This article highlights the various flaws in the way CME is conducted,
financed, regulated, and evaluated. Part II discusses the regulatory
framework for CME activities, including the accreditation process and the
history of the roles of the FDA and the HHS Office of Inspector General's
(OIG's) roles in ensuring independence and reliability in CME content.
Part III focuses on the various shortcomings of the current regulatory
schemes that seek to protect against undue industry influence in CME
activity. Finally, Part IV provides recommendations for improving the
CME programming framework to ensure accountability and independence
for CME providers.
II. HISTORY AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT
CME REGULATION REGIME
While HHS has largely left CME regulation to ACCME, a regulatory
framework does exist - made up of various federal laws, regulations, and
industry codes. The federal government has a hand in preventing off-label
marketing that occurs during CME activities, though courts have largely
restricted it from directly regulating CME content because of First
Amendment concerns. 14 Instead, the ACCME's accreditation standards and
its Standards for Commercial Support are the primary means of regulation
for CME activities."s The ACCME enforces its guidelines through the
threat of revoking a CME provider's accreditation.1 6  Other voluntary
guidelines, such as the OIG's Compliance Program Guidance for
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and the Pharmaceutical Research
BLOG (July 30, 2009), http://pharmamkting.blogspot.com/2009/07/nissen-puts-stake-through
-accmes-heart.html.
12. Physician Payments Sunshine Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7h(a)(1)(A) (West,
WestlawNext through P.L 113-31).
13. See 42 C.F.R. § 403.904(g)(1) (West, WestlawNext through Dec. 26, 2013; 78 Fed
Reg 78,691); see also Larry Husten, No Sunshine for Continuing Medical Education,
FORBES (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larryhusten/2013/02/01/no-sunshine-for-
continuing-medical-education/.
14. See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
15. See ACCME STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT, supra note 10, at 1.
16. See id.
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Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) Code, also play a role in creating an
environment that limits industry bias in CME.1  Because these other
guidelines are only voluntary, however, their effectiveness is limited.
Finally, while the federal government is restricted from regulating CME
content beyond off-label promotion, it can require full disclosure of
industry payments to physicians through the Physician Payments Sunshine
Act (PPSA). This legislation, too, is limited in curbing industry influence,
as the final regulations do not require disclosure of industry payments to
accredited CME providers. This section defines CME and explains the
various forms of industry bias before discussing each of these sources of
CME regulation and its effectiveness in curbing industry bias in CME
activities.
A What is CME?
Graduating from medical school and completing residency mark the first
steps in a physician's career-long commitment to education." Physicians
obtain this continued education through CME programs. CME consists of
presentations and discussions on specific treatments and developments in
medicine and helps physicians and other medical professionals obtain
information and insights that can improve patient care.1 9 CME is required
by most state licensing authorities in order for physicians to maintain their
medical license.20 Hospitals and other institutions may impose additional
CME requirements on physicians who practice at their facilities.21
Many CME programs are either partially or fully subsidized by
pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers whose products are often
related to the topic of the CME program.22 Therefore, CME can provide an
effective forum through which industry sponsors market their products and
increase prescriptions for their products. Drug companies' interests,
17. See generally PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH
HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 1, 6 (2009) [hereinafter PHRMA CODE], available at
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/phrma-marketing-code_2008-1.pdf.
18. Medical Research and Education: Higher Learning or Higher Earning?: Hearing
before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 111th Cong. 1 (July 29, 2009) (statement of Lewis
Morris, Chief Counsel to the Inspector Gen., Dep't of Health & Human Servs.) [hereinafter
Morris Testimony], available at https://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/2009/07292009_oig
testimony.pdf.
19. See AM. MED. Ass'N, THE PHYSICIAN'S RECOGNITION AWARD AND CREDIT SYSTEM 2
(2010), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/cme/pra-booklet.pdf.
20. See generally AM. MED. Ass'N, STATE MEDICAL LICENSURE REQUIREMENTS AND
STATISTICS 53-56 (2010), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/40/
table 16.pdf.
21. Id. at 1.
22. See ACCME ANNUAL REPORT-2012, supra note 5, at 10.
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however, do not necessarily align with physicians' interests in providing the
best possible care for their patients, as such companies have stockholders
and therefore aim to maximize profits and increase market share.23
B. Commercial Bias in CME
Because CME providers depend financially on pharmaceutical and
medical device companies, the potential for bias and conflicts of interest is
great. In particular, there is a risk that companies will use CME as a means
to inappropriately influence health professionals to increase their market
shares.24 Generally, two major forms of commercial bias in the CME
context: (1) commercial content bias, where the content or format of a CME
activity is designed to promote a specific product of one of the commercial
sponsor; and (2) commercial topic bias, where the prevalence of topics
becomes skewed toward topics that are commercially supported.25
Content bias can take place in a variety of ways. For example, a drug
company might provide slides for a particular speaker at a CME activity to
ensure that the speaker discusses their drug, or a drug company might plant
an audience member to ask a particular question about their drug. The most
blatant form of content bias occurs when a CME program funded by a drug
company presents information about a drug that unfairly compares it to
other drugs by making claims that a specific drug is the best treatment.26
Drug companies also realize they can profit from merely urging physicians
to prescribe a particular class of drugs in which their product exists.2
A well-known example of content bias in CME occurred in the 2000s
when AstraZeneca's used CMEs to promote off-label uses for its anti-
psychotic drug Seroquel, a drug approved to treat schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder in adult patients.28 Federal prosecutors alleged that AstraZeneca
had targeted its illegal marketing towards doctors who do not typically treat
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, such as primary care physicians,
23. INST. OF MED., supra note 1.
24. See id. at 71.
25. ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING MED. EDUC., STATEMENT FROM THE
ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION (ACCME) TO THE
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE COMMITTEE ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH,
EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 11 (2008), available at http://accme.org/sites/default/files/null/
151305e9-cb64-4bac-8539-fe010b640527_uploaddocument.pdf.
26. See HOWARD BRODY, HOOKED: ETHICS, THE MEDICAL PROFESSION AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 206 (2007).
27. See id. at 207.
28. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Pharmaceutical Giant AstraZeneca to Pay $520
Million for Off-label Drug Marketing (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/April/10-civ-487.html.
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pediatricians, and geriatricians.29 AstraZeneca allegedly unduly influenced
speakers participating in company-sponsored CME by providing them with
content to use during presentations. 30 In response to these allegations that it
engaged in a widespread scheme to illegally promote off-label uses for
Seroquel, the company settled for $520 million.31
Topic bias, on the other hand, occurs when CME covers topics that have
the most commercial (i.e., industry) support, rather than topics that fill gaps
32in medical education geared toward achieving better patient outcomes.
CME providers develop programming that attracts funding from drug and
device companies - programming that involves treatments using the drug
and device companies' products.33 Topic bias is detrimental to patient care
because it results in physicians learning about treatments that involve use of
specific drugs or medical devices rather than treatments that achieve the
best outcomes.34 As this article explains below, most CME regulation aims
to limit content and topic bias,35 thereby ensuring that CME programming
does not serve as a platform for drug and device companies to engage in
off-label promotion.
C. History of the FDA's Regulation of CME
In the 1980s, drug and device companies began increasing their funding
for CME seminars and they routinely paid physicians' expenses for
registration, travel, and lodging for CME programming.36 Recognizing the
dangers of too much industry influence on CME, the FDA considered
stepping in to regulate CME in the early-1990s. 37 In response, the
American Medical Association (AMA) and the Pharmaceutical Research
Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) issued voluntary guidelines
prohibiting such funding in an effort to prevent stricter federal oversight.38
Nonetheless, in 1992 the FDA issued a draft policy indicating that although
drug company-controlled CME programs could not recommend off-label
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See INST. OF MED., supra note 1.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See, e.g., Accreditation Council for Continuing Med. Educ., Standards for
Commercial Support: Standards to Ensure Independence in CME Activities,
http://www.accme.org/printpdf/requirements/accreditation-requirements-cme-
providers/standards-for-commercial-support (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
36. See Rodwin, supra note 10, at 810.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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uses, the CME, independent of industry influence, could recommend off-
label uses. 39 This 1992 draft still allowed commercial funders, such as drug
and device companies, to recommend speakers for individual events.40
CME providers and faculty were required to disclose their financial
relationships with commercial funders, and faculty that discussed off-label
41drug uses had to state that the FDA had not approved the uses.
1. 1997 CME Guidance
In 1997, the FDA published its final guidance document relating to the
commercial support of CME that was less stringent than the 1992 guidance:
the Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities (CME Guidance).42 The CME Guidance contained a list of
twelve factors that industry and CME providers could use to help keep
CME activities independent of industry influence.43 The FDA stated that it
would not prosecute CME providers that discussed off-label uses for failing
to meet one of its criteria for independence.44
The 1997 guidance made it clear that the FDA did not intend to regulate
industry-supported CME programs that are independent of the influence of
45the supporting company. Rather, the FDA published the guidance
document to provide a list of factors on which companies and CME
providers can rely, to ensure that their activities are free from the supporting
manufacturer's influence .46
2. Washington Legal Foundation Cases
In 1997, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) challenged the CME
guidance alleging that it unconstitutionally restricted commercial speech.
The WLF sought to enjoin the FDA from enforcing or relying on its
policies restricting manufacturer off-label promotion of drugs and devices
39. Draft Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities,
57 Fed. Reg. 56,412 (Nov. 27, 1992).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3 1997).
43. Id. at 64,097-99 (indicating that some of the factors included control of content and
selection of presenters and moderators; disclosures; the focus of the program; the audience
selection; the opportunities for discussion; provider involvement in sales or marketing;
complaints, etc.).
44. See Rodwin, supra note 10, at 810-11.
45. 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,076.
46. Id.
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through its involvement in CME seminars and symposia.4 Applying the
test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm 'n
of New York,48 the court found that the guidance documents violated the
First Amendment because they were not the least burdensome method of
restriction on commercial speech. 49  The court pointed out that full,
complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the manufacturer would advance
the FDA's interest while placing a smaller burden on manufacturers>. The
court thus granted summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction
barring the FDA from continuing to enforce its off-label marketing policies
based on the guidance documents. 1
Under the injunction, a manufacturer was still required to disclose its
interest in the subject drug or device if it "sponsors or provides financial
support" for the CME program in which unapproved uses are referenced.
The manufacturer was also still required to disclose that the FDA had not
approved the referenced use. The court's order, however, enjoined the FDA
from prohibiting manufacturers from suggesting content or speakers in
connection with a CME program as long as the manufacturer met two
conditions: (1) the manufacturer made the two disclosures, and (2) the
program was administered by an "independent program provider." 52
The FDA ultimately took the position that the CME guidance did not
independently authorize it to prohibit or sanction speech. 53  Because the
FDA claimed that the guidance document was not binding on the agency,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia later vacated the
47. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1998)
amended by 36 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999) appeal dismissed, judgment vacated in part
sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) and amended by 36
F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.D.C. 1999) and appeal dismissed, judgment vacated in part sub nom
Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
48. 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (finding that a law or regulation restricts free speech in a
commercial setting will violate the First Amendment by considering the following factors:
(1) whether the speech at issue concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) whether
the asserted government interest is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest).
49. WLF I at 73.
50. Id. (noting that full disclosure is less restrictive on speech while also dealing more
precisely with the FDA's concerns).
51. Id. at 74.
52. Id. at 74-75 (defining "independent program provider" as one that has (i) has no
common ownership or other corporate affiliation with the manufacturer, engages in the
business of creating and producing CME seminars, and (ii) is accredited by a national
accrediting organization pertinent to the topic of the seminars).
53. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney (WLF II), 202 F.3d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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injunction. The FDA then issued a notice regarding the WLF II case,
stating that it would continue to use the CME guidance in its enforcement
but that a manufacturer may raise the First Amendment defense if the FDA
brought an enforcement action. After the WLF moved to reaffirm the
prior injunction, the district court expressed disapproval of the FDA's
notice, describing it as a "farce" and suggesting that its policy of inviting
56
constitutional challenges does not solve any constitutional issues.
Nonetheless, the court did not reaffirm the prior injunction.5
D. Current Federal Approach: FDA and OIG Enforcement
of Off-Label Promotion, False Claims Act, and
Anti-Kickback Statute Violations
As a result of the WLF cases, the FDA has little room to regulate CME
activities directly. However, industry support for CME may implicate
several federal laws in specific circumstances. One example is the FDA
and OIG's regulation of off-label marketing. Under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), a drug or device manufacturer may not introduce a
new drug, biologic, or device into interstate commerce without having
obtained approval from the FDA for the product's label. 8 When its label
contains information that has not been approved by the FDA pursuant to the
drug's new drug application (NDA) or supplemental NDA, a new drug's
label is illegally false or misleading. 59 Further, while physicians may
prescribe drugs or devices for unapproved, or "off-label" use, the FDCA
prohibits any company from marketing such products for any off-label
use.60
Realizing the opportunities to increase drug sales through physicians
prescribing drugs for off-label uses, drug companies seek to promote their
drugs for off-label uses in any legal (and illegal) way possible. Drug
companies often fund CME activities specifically because they can
effectively promote off-label uses for their products under the regulatory
protections enjoyed by accredited CME, as its content is scientifically
54. Id. at 337.
55. Decision in Wash. Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286 (Mar. 16,
2000).
56. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 128 F.Supp.2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2000).
57. Id. at 16.
58. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(a)-(b) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-31).
59. Id.; see also § 331(a) (providing that introducing a misbranded drug into interstate
commerce is a "prohibited act"); § 334(a)(1) (providing that prohibited drugs introduced into
interstate commerce are subject to seizure by the FDA).
60. See § 352(a).
9
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supported and peer-reviewed. Thus, the FDA cannot directly regulate CME
content unless it has sufficient evidence that the drug company's role in the
CME program amounted to off-label promotion.
Another law that is implicated when a drug company promotes off-label
uses for a drug during a CME event is the Federal False Claims Act
(FCA). 61 The FCA provides that anyone who knowingly presents or causes
to present a false or fraudulent claim for payment or reimbursement for
medical items or services, or makes or causes to be made a false record or
statement material to an obligation to pay the government is liable for a
civil monetary penalty plus treble damages, which can be hundreds of
millions of dollars. 62  The FCA is implicated when a pharmaceutical
manufacturer engages in a scheme to promote off-label uses for its drugs
and the illegal marketing campaign results in the submission of claims for
payment from federal healthcare programs. 63  Conspiring to submit false
claims, such as a CME provider knowingly collaborating in the promotion
of an off-label use, could also lead to a cause of action under the FCA.
CME programs funded by drug or device manufacturers may also
implicate the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute. 64 The Anti-Kickback Statute
prohibits payments to induce the referral of beneficiaries of federal
healthcare programs.65 It targets any person or entity that knowingly and
willfully solicits or receives any remuneration or offers or pays any
remuneration related to furnishing or obtaining items or services paid by a
federal healthcare program.66 In the CME context, the Anti-Kickback
Statute is implicated when a pharmaceutical manufacturer directs a CME
provider to pay a physician to speak at a CME event in exchange for the
physician prescribing more of the drug company's products.
While these laws are expansive and largely effective in deterring or
punishing illegal kickbacks and off-label marketing,67 they were not
developed to limit industry influence on CME activity specifically. As
61. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-31).
62. Id.; see also Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in
Fraud Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/
glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-billion-in-fraud-settlement.html?pagewanted=all.
63. See § 3729(g).
64. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-3 1).
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Notably, illegal kickback and off-label marketing are still widespread practices, as
evidenced by the many settlements drug companies enter into with the federal government.
See, e.g., Katie Thomas, Johnson & Johnson Unit Settles State Cases Over Risperdal, N.Y.
TIIEs (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/business/johnson-johnson-unit-
settles-state-cases-over-risperdal.html; Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Settlement,
supra note 62.
10
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demonstrated by the WLF line of cases, courts tend to disfavor federal
enforcement of laws in contexts that inhibit commercial speech in the
medical fields.68 Thus, the Anti-Kickback Statute, the FDCA, and the FCA
are largely ineffective in regulating commercial bias in CME.
E. The OIG Guidelines
In 2003, the OIG issued proposed guidelines that restricted
pharmaceutical and medical device funding of CME activities.69 After the
AMA, PhRMA, and more than twenty-five medical societies requested that
OIG drop the restrictions on CME funding, the OIG, in its 2003 final
guidelines, conceded.70 As the OIG stated in its final guidance, "support for
educational activities sponsored and organized by medical professional
organizations raise little risk of fraud or abuse." Still, OIG explained that
72
commercial sponsors risk prosecution when they control CME content.
The guidelines recommend that drug and device companies separate
marketing activities from grant making activities.73 These guidelines,
however, still leave much of the enforcement and compliance monitoring
up to the ACCME and their Standards for Commercial Support.
F. The ACCME's Standards for Commercial Support
In addition to compliance with the federal laws described above and
voluntary compliance with the OIG guidance, CME providers must comply
with the ACCME accreditation guidelines and Standards for Commercial
Support. While the FDA and OIG largely defer to the ACCME - a non-
governmental fee-funded group - for compliance monitoring, the ACCME
standards fall short of minimizing commercial influence on CME activity.
For example, the ACCME Standards for Commercial Support allow
providers to show potential and current funders their draft program and
receive suggestions from industry sponsors. 7 The standards only prohibit
an industry sponsor from requiring a CME provider to accept advice or
services concerning teachers, authors, participants, or other education
68. See, e.g., WLF II.
69. Draft OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 67
Fed. Reg. 62,057 (Oct. 3, 2002).
70. Rodwin, supra note 10, at 811; see OIG Compliance Program Guidance for
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731 (May 5, 2003).
71. 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,738.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Rodwin, supra note 10, at 811.
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75
matters, including content, as conditions of contributing funds or services.
This section summarizes the ACCME standards with which CME providers
must comply to obtain accreditation, develop a CME topic, and solicit funds
from industry sponsors. It also highlights the deficiencies in the ACCME's
standards and enforcement processes.
1. Obtaining Accreditation
For a CME provider to be able to give CME credits to physicians, the
provider must first obtain ACCME "accreditation." 76 The ACCME
accreditation standards contain provisions to ensure that CME is
independent, based on valid content, and contributes to health care
improvement for patients. The ACCME accredits hundreds of CME
providers, most of which are physician membership organizations,
publishing/education companies, medical schools, and healthcare delivery
systems. One of the primary requirements for eligibility is that the
organization applying for accreditation not be a "commercial interest,"
defined as any entity producing, marketing, reselling, or distributing
healthcare goods or services consumed by, or used on, patients.79 This
policy seeks to ensure that organizations developing CME stay district from
entities with commercial interests in healthcare goods or services.o A
CME provider also cannot advocate for a commercial interest, have a parent
company that advocates for a commercial interest, or have a sister company
that advocates for a commercial interest or is a commercial interest." If an
75. See ACCME STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT, supra note 10, para. 3.2.
76. See PHRMA CODE, supra note 17, at 6. Pharmaceutical and device manufacturers
need not obtain accreditation to sponsor their own programs as part of so-called "non-CME"
or "informational presentations." Id. At these events, a drug company through a speaker has
free rein to say whatever it wants - subject to the restrictions in the PhRMA Code, which is a
voluntary code, and in the FDCA, Anti-Kickback Statute, and FCA. Id. While these
financial interactions between industry and physicians present issues of reliability and bias
for information presented to physicians, an in depth discussion of non-accredited CME
activities is beyond the scope of this paper. Id.
77. ACCME STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT, supra note 10.
78. BERNARD Lo & MARILYN J. FIELD, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH,
EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 140 (2009) (noting that ACCME had 740 accredited CME
providers in 2008).
79. See Accreditation Council for Continuing Med. Educ., Definition of a Commercial
Interest, http://www.accme.org/printpdf/requirements/accreditation-requirements-cme-provi
ders/policies-and-definitions/definition-commercial-interest (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
80. Accreditation Council for Continuing Med. Educ., Determining Your Eligibility,
http://www.accme.org/printpdf/cme-providers/first-time-applicant/determining-your-
eligibility (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
81. Accreditation Council for Continuing Med. Educ., See How Can I Determine if My
Organization is a Commercial Interest?, http://accme.org/printpdf/ask-accme/how-can-i-
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applicant is unsure whether it is an ACCME-defined commercial interest, it
can request a corporate structure review from the ACCME for a $4,000
fee. 82
If the applicant is eligible to apply for accreditation, it must then verify
through a document review process that it is capable of complying with
ACCME Standards for Commercial Support.83 The ACCME makes an
initial accreditation decision based upon the organization's demonstration
of its ability to maintain a compliance program to root out conflicts of
interest and to prevent control or influence of CME content by industry
sponsors. 84 Receiving initial accreditation results in a two-year provisional
accreditation term, after which the organization can obtain either a four- or
six-year term of accreditation.8 5
2. Developing and Obtaining Approval for a Topic
Before planning a specific CME program, a CME provider must first
develop a topic - a process that can be ripe for undue influence and bias
from industry. Interestingly, the ACCME Standards for Commercial
Support do not prohibit CME providers from asking pharmaceutical or
device companies about topics or speakers. The industry sponsor may not,
however, require the provider to accept advice or services concerning
teachers, authors, participants, or content as conditions of contributing
funds or services.86 The ACCME Standards for Commercial Support
require that the provider make independent decisions about how it uses this
advice from commercial entities and prohibits the commercial supporter
from controlling the content or speakers in any way.
3. Obtaining Commercial Support for CME Activities
After obtaining approval to hand out CME credit for a given CME
activity, a provider can solicit drug and device companies for commercial
support. The ACCME Standards for Commercial Support define
determine-if-my-organization-commercial-interest (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
82. Determining Your Eligibility, supra note 80.
83. Accreditation Council for Continuing Med. Educ., Initial Accreditation Process
http://www.accme.org/printpdf/cme-providers/first-time-applicant/initial-accreditation-
process (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
84. Accreditation Council for Continuing Med. Educ., How the ACCME
Makes Decisions, http://www.accme.org/printpdf/cme-providers/first-time-applicant/how-
accme-makes-decisions (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
85. Id.
86. ACCME STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT, supra note 10, at 3.
87. Id.
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"commercial support" as financial or "in-kind contributions given by a
commercial interest that are used to pay all or part of the costs of a CME
activity. Examples include meals, speaker honoraria, travel expenses, or
a meeting space. 89 When a provider decides to solicit funds from drug and
device manufacturers, it must first inform the ACCME of its intent to do so
by listing potential commercial supporters on a sponsorship application.90
When completing grant requests, the provider must also demand that any
payments be made directly to the provider, as opposed to any speakers or
vendors. 91  Once the provider approves a request, the manufacturer
generally responds with a Letter of Agreement (LOA), which the provider
submits to the ACCME prior to the date of the CME program.92
The CME provider must make all decisions regarding the disposition and
disbursement of commercial support. The industry sponsor cannot require
the provider to accept advice or services concerning teachers (speakers),
authors, participants, or content as a condition of contributing funds. The
parties, including the CME provider, must include in a signed written
agreement the terms, conditions, and purposes for the commercial support.93
The CME provider must be able to produce accurate documentation
showing the receipt and expenditure of the commercial support.94
Further, the CME provider must be able to show that everyone who is in
a position to control the content of an education activity has disclosed all
relevant financial relationships with any commercial interest to the CME
provider.95 CME providers must have a formal process to identify and
resolve any conflicts of interest. 96  These ACCME standards aimed at
resolving conflicts of interest target those in a position to control CME
content. For example, the ACCME requires CME providers to give a
88. Id. at 13.
89. See id. at 4.
90. See id. at 11.
91. Id. at 4.
92. See ACCME STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT, supra note 10, at 4, 13. A
LOA is a written agreement specifying the terms, conditions, and purposes of the
commercial support awarded by a commercial entity to a provider. Id. All commercial
support requires a LOA with the signatures of the director of the CME provider and the
supporting company. Id.
93. See id. at 4.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 13 (defining "relevant financial relationships" as financial relationships in any
amount occurring within the previous twelve months that create a conflict of interest). An
individual who refuses to disclose any relevant financial relationship is disqualified from
being a planning committee member, teacher, or author of CME and cannot have any control
over the presentation or evaluation of the CME program. Id. at 3.
96. Id.
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balanced view of therapeutic options and encourages the use of generic
names of therapies, rather than promoting the proprietary names.
4. Problems with ACCME Standards for Commercial Support
The availability of industry funding affects the types of CME programs
being offered. If alignment with industry interests determines CME
content, areas that lack industry support, some of which may be better for
patient health outcomes, generally receive less funding. A drug company
generally only funds CME programming that involves discussion of a drug
or class of drugs related to one of the company's products, even though
such drugs may not yield better health outcomes as other potential topics of
CME programming.97 Thus, reducing the amount of funding from
commercial interests would likely change the nature of CME content,
focused on better patient health outcomes than those having to do with
specific drugs and devices.
The ACCME guidelines are largely ineffective at limiting bias as result
of influential industry interests at the topic selection and funding
solicitation stages. Standard 3.2 of the ACCME Standards for Commercial
Support provides that an industry funder cannot require a CME provider to
accept advice or services concerning teachers, authors, participants, or
content of programming as conditions of contributing funds or services.9
However, this provision does not expressly prohibit drug and device
companies from offering advice, CME providers from soliciting
suggestions, or CME providers from voluntarily following suggestions from
commercial supporters.9
Consider a hypothetical situation in which a Pharm Inc. manufactures the
drug Cholesteran, which is FDA approved for lowering cholesterol in
adults. A CME provider approaches Pharm Inc. for topic ideas for an
upcoming CME activity. Pharm Inc. suggests that treatments for childhood
obesity would be a novel and informative topic and informs the CME
provider that studies have proven that Cholesteran is effective in lowering
cholesterol levels in obese children with high cholesterol. The CME
provider thanks Pharm Inc. for its input and ultimately decides to plan a
CME activity about treatments for childhood obesity. Pharm Inc. does not
provide any input as to the content of the CME activities or presentations.
Following the decision to focus on childhood obesity treatments, the CME
97. See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 74.
98. See ACCME STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT, supra note 10, at 3.
99. See id.; Rodwin, supra note 10, at 811 (finding in the author's interviews with CME
providers that these practices are in fact common).
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provider asks Pharm Inc., along with several other drug manufacturers, to
fund the CME event. Knowing that the CME program concerns a topic for
which one of the company's drugs is an effective treatment, Pharm Inc.
gladly funds the program. It does not, however, plan any CME content.
Under the ACCME Standards for Commercial Support, this interaction is
acceptable. 00 At the topic selection phase, the CME provider approached
Pharm Inc., and Pharm Inc. provided its thoughts without requiring the
CME provider to pursue the topic it suggested. At the CME planning
phases, the CME provider approached Pharm Inc. about funding and Pharm
Inc. provided funding knowing that Cholesteran, or at least Cholesteran's
class of drugs, would likely be mentioned without requiring the CME
provider to mention such information.
Even though Pharm Inc. did not require the CME provider to do
anything, the company influenced the CME provider by providing input and
financial support. The CME provider planned the CME event about
treatments for childhood obesity knowing that Pharm Inc. would likely fund
the program. This exemplifies how CME programs cover topics that
support drug and device-based treatments without explicit direction from
drug and device companies. Moreover, the CME provider is more likely to
include information about its commercial supporters' products, including
Pharm Inc.'s Cholesteran, knowing that Pharm Inc. otherwise might not
support the CME provider's next CME activity. CME providers, whether
not-for-profit medical organizations or for-profit commercial companies,
depend on the funding they receive from industry for their continued
success. CME providers instead seek to develop long-term relationships
with commercial supporters. 101
Conflicts of interest are particularly problematic at the topic selection
and funding solicitation stages with medical education and communications
companies (MECCs). MECCs are for-profit companies that advertise their
programming to the drug industry to obtain commercial support.102 Drug
and device companies often hire MECCs to organize meetings, find
speakers for conferences or lectures, and develop enduring materials.103
Often located in close proximity to the headquarters of major
pharmaceutical and device companies, MECCs solicit funds from the
pharmaceutical industry to put on various educational activities. 104 As
Steven E. Nissen, M.D., Chairman of the Department of Cardiovascular
100. See ACCME STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT, supra note 10, at 3.
101. See id.
102. BRODY, supra note 26, at 209.
103. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 67.
104. See Nissen Testimony, supra note 11.
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Medicine at Cleveland Clinic, stated in his testimony before the Senate
Committee on Aging in 2009, MECCs provide a "veneer of independence"
that hide the promotional nature of CME programming.105 The brochures
often state that the program was funded through an unrestricted educational
grant from the sponsoring company, even though the MECCs often select
speakers and topics that they know will please the companies funding their
activities.106 In fact, Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline ceased their funding of
CME programming organized by for-profit MECCs to avoid the appearance
of impropriety due to suspect relationships that had developed between
MECCs and industry. 107
Despite the fact that the ACCME has updated its accreditation
requirements and standards for commercial support several times over the
past decade, the organization has not enforced the standards.10 s Data shows
that CME providers have breached the ACCME standards. In 2007, the
ACCME found that one in four of its accredited CME providers was openly
breaching ACCME guidelines. 1 09  The ACCME's role in restricting
commercial bias is limited. It does not preapprove CME content and
routinely does not monitor CME programs.110 Oversight is largely after the
fact; it occurs once ACCME learns of a complaint concerning a
noncompliant CME activity."' Furthermore, the ACCME's safeguards
cannot detect when a drug company plants an individual in the audience at a
CME event to ask a particular question about a drug, to ensure that the
discussion includes that drug. 112  Moreover, the ACCME's primary
enforcement tool is revocation of a CME provider's accreditation, which
may occur for until significantly after the noncompliance.11 To monitor
bias in CME, the ACCME requires providers to survey participants about
commercial bias at the conclusion of events.114 Participants, however, may
not be in the best position to detect the bias.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Janice Hopkins Tanne, Pfizer Stops Funding Medical Education Run by For-
Profit Companies, 337 BMJ 73 (2008). It is important to note that MECCs can be
significant resources; for example, they can supply well-trained staff who provide high
quality CME programming. See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 72.
108. See, e.g., Nissen Testimony, supra note 11.
109. BRODY, supra note 26, at 319-20.
110. Morris Testimony, supra note 18.
111. Id.
112. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 72.
113. See id.; see also Morris Testimony, supra note 18 (noting that in one case up to
nine years elapsed between identification of noncompliance with ACCME standards and
revocation of a CME provider's accreditation).
114. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 72.
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To resolve the issues with relying on volunteer participant reporting, the
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) recommended that it
and other interest groups collaborate with the ACCME to create a process
through which CME offerings would be externally evaluated for
compliance with applicable guidelines. 1 5  However, until such voluntary
processes are widely implemented, the ACCME's ability to minimize
commercial bias is limited. For these reasons, in its 2007 investigation of
industry influence on CME activities, the Senate Finance Committee found
that ACCME standards were inadequate.16 The Senate committee cited the
ways in which the standards enable CME providers to accommodate
suggestions and input from drug companies while claiming independence
because the drug companies are not requiring them to do anything.1
G. State Approaches to CME Regulation
States have their own standards for interactions between CME providers
and industry sponsors, which can be stricter than the ACCME standards.1
The Massachusetts Pharmaceutical and Device Manufacturer Code of
Conduct, for example, provides that a pharmaceutical manufacturer "shall
not provide any advice or guidance to the CME provider regarding the
content or faculty for a particular CME program funded by the
company."119 The Massachusetts requirements, unlike the ACCME
Standards for Commercial Support, provide no leeway for CME providers
to solicit or accept advice or suggestions regarding topics, content, or
speakers. This model arguably would limit industry influence on CME
more effectively than the ACCME standards, assuming the code was
properly enforced. Still, this approach is limited to the individual state in
which it is implemented.120
115. See generally Ass'N OF AM. MED. COLLS., INDUSTRY FUNDING OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION: REPORT OF AN AAMC TASK FORCE (2008), available at https://members.aamc.
org/eweb/upload/Industry%20Funding%20of%20Medical%20Education.pdf.
116. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 110TH CONG., USE OF EDUCATIONAL GRANTS
BY PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS 16 (Comm. Print 2007)
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Manufacturer Conduct, 105 MASS.
CODE REGS. 970.000-011 (West, WestlawNext through Dec. 6, 2013, Register #1249).
119. Id. § 970.007(3).
120. While payments to CME providers increased sixteen percent (over $1.2 million)
between 2010 and 2011 after the Massachusetts Pharmaceutical and Medical Device
Manufacturer Code of Conduct was amended, no data is currently available to determine the
effectiveness of this particular provision in terms of limiting commercial bias. See Thomas
Sullivan, Massachusetts Posts 2011 Payments to Healthcare Providers: 3% Drop in
Payments, POLICYMED (Mar. 6, 2013, 5:41 AM), http://www.policymed.com/2013/03/
massachusetts-posts-2011-payments-to-healthcare-providers-3-drop-in-payments.html.
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H. PhRMA Code and AMA Guidelines
PhRMA and the AMA have their own guidelines concerning industry
support for CME, which largely defer to the ACCME standards. 121 The
PhRMA Code provides that a drug company's CME grant-making should
be completely separate from its sales and marketing departments.122
Moreover, the Code provides that a drug company should develop objective
criteria for making CME grant decisions to ensure that programs funded by
the company are bona fide educational programs and that the financial
support is not an inducement to prescribe or recommend a particular
drug.12'3 The company should not provide any advice or guidance to the
CME provider regarding the content or faculty for a particular CME
program funded by the company.1 24 The PhRMA Code also provides that
companies should not offer financial support for the costs of travel, lodging,
or other personal expenses of non-faculty healthcare professionals attending
the event, nor should money be offered for time spent participating at the
CME event. 125
The AMA's guidelines concerning financial relationships between
Industry and CME providers offer similar voluntary standards for
physicians who organize or speak at CME activities. 126 The AMA
guidelines state that physicians should be transparent about financial
relationships that could influence educational activities and that the
processes for making decisions about participation by physicians who may
have a financial interest in the CME content should be transparent. 127 The
guidelines also emphasize giving preference for faculty or content
developer positions to similarly qualified experts without a financial interest
in the subject matter.128
Though the PhRMA and AMA guidelines reflect efforts to encourage
physicians and Industry parties involved in planning CME activities to
121. See PHRMA CODE, supra note 17, at 6. The medical device industry has a similar
code governing interactions with health care providers. See also ANVAMED, CODE OF
ETHICS ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS (2009), available at
http://advamed.org/res/112/advamed-code-of-ethics-on-interactions-with-health-care-
professionals (click "Open").
122. Id. at 6.
123. Id. at 2, 10.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id.
126. See AM. MED. Ass'N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, FINANCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDUSTRY IN CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION (2011), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/code-medical-ethics/90115a.pdf.
127. See id. at 6, 9.
128. Id. at 9.
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minimize Industry influence on CME, the guidelines are only voluntary.
Drug companies are not required to follow the PhRMA Code, and
physicians are not required to comply with AMA guidelines on financial
relationships with industry. Thus, the guidelines' effectiveness is limited
by their lack of enforceability. Other than FDA and OIG's enforcement of
off-label marketing and Anti-Kickback violations, the ACCME Standards
for Commercial Support are the only mandatory standards with which CME
providers must comply to obtain or retain their accreditation.
I. Hospital CME Conflict of Interest Policies
Many hospital networks have their own conflict of interest policies, some
of which are stricter than the ACCME Standards for Commercial Support.
Partners Healthcare (Partners), for example, includes several hospitals that
serve Harvard University and maintains a strict conflict-of-interest
policy. 129 The Partners' policy presents another example of standards with
which some CME providers must comply.
Though it requires compliance with the ACCME Standards for
Commercial Support for many of its policies, the Partners' policy goes
further than the ACCME standards in several key respects. For example,
industry support for a specific CME activity must come from more than one
drug or device company, and no single industry entity can provide more
than seventy percent of the total commercial support.13 0 Industry support
for a particular CME activity must also be disclosed to the participants prior
to the beginning of the event.13
Two of the more progressive elements of Partners' policy are the
Educational Review Board (ERB) and the President's Fund. Partners'
institutions may not accept industry funding for any educational programs
except through the ERB or the President's Fund mechanisms.132 The ERB
is responsible for approving, monitoring, and reviewing industry-supported
educational programs.133 It must review and approve all support from
industry sponsors for any CME activities and conduct more specific content
reviews of presentations and programs that it deems to present particular
concerns with conflicts of interest before the CME event. 134  The
129. See PARTNERS HEALTHCARE, POLICY FOR INTERACTIONS WITH INDUSTRY AND OTHER
OUTSIDE ENTITIES 62 (2012), available at http://www.partners.org/Assets/Documents/About-
Us/OII/OIIPolicy.pdf.
130. Id. § 3.3.4.
131. Id. § 3.3.6.
132. See id. §§ 3.1.2, 3.4.
133. Id. § 3.2.1.
134. Id. §§ 3.2.2-3.2.3.
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President's Fund operates as a slush fund, set up at each hospital within the
network to support CME activities determined by the individual hospital to
be a topic of priority.135 Drug and device companies are encouraged to
contribute to the fund, though companies do not know what specific CME
topics their money will support.13 6 A company cannot target or direct its
contribution to any specific educational program to any specific educational
137
program.
Partners designed both the ERB and the President's Fund to limit drug
and device company influence on CME topics and content. 13 By screening
CME presentations and content for commercial bias, the ERB ensures that
CME activities offered by Partners present balanced viewpoints and
accurately reflect the research performed on individual topics. 139 Partners
only provides funding from the President's Fund for CME programming
geared toward improving patient outcomes rather than the brand name
drugs or devices. 140 However, these procedures cannot achieve widespread
success in limiting industry bias because they are currently only
implemented at the hospital network level.
J. Disclosure over Prohibition:
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act
Congress attempted to address the inefficiencies of the ACCME
Standards for Commercial Support by implementing the Physician
Payments Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act) as part of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA). The Sunshine Act requires drug and device
manufacturers to disclose any direct payments, indirect payments, or other
transfers of value made to physicians. 141 CMS intends to eventually publish
this data on a searchable online public database.142 Failure to report any of
these payments results in a fine of $1000 to $10,000 per violation, with a
maximum fine of $150,000. 143 Knowingly failing to report results in a fine
of $10,000 to $100,000 per violation, with a maximum total fine of $1
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See id. §§ 3.2, 3.4.
139. See id. § 3.2.
140. See id. § 3.4.
141. Physician Payments Sunshine Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7h(a)(1)(A) (West,
WestlawNext through P.L. 113-36).
142. Id. § 1320a-7h(c)(1)(C).
143. Id. § 1320a-7h(b)(1).
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million. 14
After issuing the proposed regulations under the Sunshine Act, CMS
received many comments criticizing the requirement that CME providers
report "indirect payments" to physicians who attend CME programs
partially or fully sponsored by Industry.145 Many commenters argued that
the reporting requirements were overly burdensome and would deter
funding for essential CME programming. 146 They opined that the reporting
requirements of the Sunshine Act would be duplicative of the requirements
of the ACCME Standards and would deter financial support from
industry. 147 Further, they urged that requiring disclosure of payments to
CME providers would result in higher admission costs for CME and fewer
CME activities. 148 CMS agreed with these arguments in its final rules,
which excluded payments to third-party CME providers from the definition
of "indirect payment," if the drug or device companies do not select the
speakers or provide a list of potential speakers.149 Accordingly, drug and
device manufacturers need not disclose payments to accredited third-party
CME providers as long as the manufacturer does not condition its payment
on use of any particular content or speakers.15 0 In other words, drug and
device companies are not required to report most payments routed through
accredited CME providers.1s1
The exception for indirect payments contradicts the purpose of the
Sunshine Act, which is to provide for transparency and accountability in the
relationships between physicians and industry. 152 The regulatory loophole
allows industry to conceal payments to physicians that would otherwise be
disclosed under the PPSA when the payments pass through third-party
accredited CME providers. 153  Instead of encouraging transparency in
industry sponsorship of CME, the industry will essentially be able to avoid
disclosure by "laundering" money through third party CME providers. The
exception for indirect payments makes sense only if CME providers are
truly independent and resistant to commercial influence. 154 Current federal
144. Id. § 1320a-7h(b)(2).
145. See Transparency Reports and Reporting of Physician Ownership or Investment
Interests, 78 Fed. Reg. 9458, 9479-80 (Feb. 8, 2013) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 402, 403).
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 9524.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
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and private regulatory regimes are mostly ineffective at curbing industry
bias. The Sunshine Act, which was supposed to present the first step in
resolving some of these inefficiencies, similarly will do little to reduce
industry influence on CME.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE COMMERCIAL BIAS
AND ENSURE INDEPENDENCE FOR CME PROVIDERS
Any form of regulating CME must balance the interests of preserving the
integrity of CME with the need for industry sponsorship to allow quality
CME programming to exist in the first place. The primary reason many
drug and device companies readily pay hundreds of millions of dollars
annually to CME is to sell their products.15s The 2007 Senate Finance
Committee report found that it seems "unlikely that this sophisticated
industry would spend such large sums on an enterprise but for the
expectation that the expenditures will be recouped by increased sales."15 6
Pharmaceutical companies would likely not spend hundreds of millions of
dollars per year on CME sponsorship it did not yield significant profits by
influencing physicians' prescribing behaviors.1 5s Indeed, the directors and
corporate officers of pharmaceutical companies have a fiduciary obligation
to their shareholders to increase profits.
Without drug and device companies' financial support for CME, the
availability of accredited CME programming would be diminished. This
argument has merit, as restricting or prohibiting industry funding of
accredited CME would fundamentally alter the way CME is created and
funded. However, it is possible to restrict industry funding or prohibit it
altogether without reducing the availability of quality CME. There are
several changes Congress, CMS, and other entities can make to improve the
reliability and independence of CME in the United States without making
CME admission costs prohibitively expensive.
A Amend the Sunshine Act Regulation to Require
Disclosure of Indirect Payments to Accredited CME Providers
Passing the Sunshine Act was a positive step in terms of increasing
transparency and accountability in the relationships between industry and
medical practitioners.s15  As it had done in its proposed rules, CMS should
155. See, e.g., Nissen Testimony, supra note 11.
156. USE OF EDUCATIONAL GRANTS BY PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS, supra note
116, at 16.
157. See Husten, supra note 13.
158. Physician Payments Sunshine Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7h(a)(1)(A) (West,
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include in the definition of "indirect payment" any payments to speakers at
accredited CME events, regardless of whether the industry sponsor
recommended any speakers.159 Otherwise, Industry sponsors could merely
route payments through CME providers to avoid disclosure, which would
contradict the purpose of the statute. Broader disclosure of industry
payments to accredited CME providers is an essential step toward reducing
commercial bias in CME.
B. Congress Should Designate Industry Funding of CME as
Taxable Income Rather than a Charitable Contribution
Currently, drug and device companies' financial support for accredited
CME is tax-deductible as a charitable business expense, which encourages
industry to fund accredited CME. 160 However, because drug and device
companies likely fund CME because they expect a return on their
investment, CME support is more akin to marketing expenses than charity.
If the government taxed commercial support for CME like any other taxable
business expense, it would likely limit the amount of industry funding for
CME, thereby driving down industry bias on CME content and topics. The
most significant issue facing CME providers with any proposal that would
limit industry funding is how such providers would establish alternative
sources of funding. Recommendations for obtaining other, more reliable
funding sources are discussed below.
C. Create a Public-Private Oversight Board
to Replace the ACCME
As the IOM recommended in its 2009 report on the status of CME,
establishing a national inter-professional institute would foster
improvements in CME. 161 This public-private entity would involve a full
spectrum of stakeholders in healthcare delivery and CME, including
representatives from CMS, IOM, the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ), and industry stakeholders.162 It would be charged with
developing and overseeing comprehensive change in the way CME is
conducted, financed, regulated, and evaluated. 163  Collectively, the
Westlaw through P.L. 113-36).
159. See Transparency Reports and Reporting of Physician Ownership or Investment
Interests, 78 Fed. Reg. 9458, 9524 (Feb. 8, 2013) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 403.904).
160. See Jerry Avorn & Niteesh K. Choudhry, Funding for Medical Education:
Maintaining a Healthy Separation from Industry, 121 CIRCULATION 2228, 2232 (2010).
161. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 1.
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
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stakeholders could develop conflict-of-interest policies and identify more
consistent funding sources to replace funding from industry stakeholders.1 64
This entity would replace the ACCME and its Standards for Commercial
Support with more rigorous standards, and the entity would also have a
more active role in seeking out funding for CME providers than the
ACCME currently does.
A public-private structure has advantages over a private structure
operated by professional societies and organizations. For example, a purely
private organization would have fewer incentives to convene regularly, and
there would be less accountability for a private oversight board than there
would be for a public-private structure.165 Similarly, a purely public
organization would be less advantageous than a public-private structure, as
it could not as readily incorporate collaborative decision-making and could
be limited by procedural and financial requirements.1 66
Though the organization would broadly communicate with and gather
input from the Industry and field members, it would ideally have a
committee that would be accountable to the Secretary of HHS. 167 The
organization's decisions would be based solely on votes of the committee
members.1 68 The committee might consider adopting a policy similar to the
Educational Review Board (ERB) of the Partners Healthcare policy to
screen any CME programming that involves industry funding.1 69 It might
also use a slush fund mechanism similar to the Partners President's Fund
for industry sponsors to donate money without knowing which CME
program their money would go toward, thus reducing topic bias. 170
Adopting stricter rules regarding commercial support and seeking out
alternative sources of funding would also mean that CME providers could
develop topics based on quality gaps rather than treatments that involve
drug and device companies' products, directly benefiting physicians and
patients.
D. CME Tax on Healthcare Entities
If the previously mentioned measures are taken to reduce or eliminate
voluntary industry funding, CME providers must find another source of
funding. One solution would be for Congress to impose a "CME tax" on
164. Id. at 7.
165. See id. at 6.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 7.
168. Id.
169. See PARTNERs HEALTHCARE, supra note 129.
170. See id. § 3.4.1.
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commercial medical firms, insurers, medical facilities, and possibly even
physicians. 1 A federal authority would then allocate the funds raised from
the tax to government certified not-for-profits that would distribute the
funds to independent CME providers.172 Drug and device companies would
be prohibited from donating funds to CME providers, even indirectly.173
The tax would earn enough revenue for CME activities, eliminating the
demand for Industry support.174
This novel proposal calls for a fundamental shift in the way CME is
funded, created, and monitored.175 It would place much of the burden of
funding CME on drug and device manufacturers, which would either absorb
the cost or pass the cost onto payors (i.e., insurers and individuals).176 The
overall cost to the public, however, would likely be relatively small.1  On
the other hand, increasing taxes in this political climate is arguably less
feasible. The public-private committee discussed above could be charged
with locating more consistent and reliable sources of alternative funding.
Still, the CME tax is a viable option Congress should consider
implementing.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current state of CME regulation is complex and inefficient. The
entity in the best position to eliminate industry bias - the ACCME - has
relatively weak accreditation standards that still allow commercial sponsors
to influence CME content. Moreover, the ACCME does not strictly enforce
its own standards. Other guidelines that go further than the ACCME
Standards for Commercial Support are only voluntary or limited in scope.
Although the medical community is hesitant to reduce or eliminate industry
support because of concern over how CME providers would make up the
lost funding, other funding mechanisms exist.
If the medical community and the federal and state government wish to
eliminate commercial bias from CME, thereby improving the overall
171. Rodwin, supra note 10, at 812.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 813.
175. For additional reading on the CME tax, see MARC A. RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND JAPAN (Feb.
2011).
176. Rodwin, supra note 10, at 813.
177. Id. (estimating that, based on country's health care spending in 2008 and annual
industry support for CME of $2 million, the cost to the public would be approximately $6.58
per person).
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quality of CME and the quality of care patients receive, they need to
acknowledge that industry bias occurs in more subtle ways than a drug
company requiring a CME provider to use certain content or speakers. As a
first step, CMS should require disclosure of industry payments to accredited
CME providers, regardless of whether a drug company requires the CME
provider to use certain speakers. Next, Congress should begin taxing
industry support for accredited CME, as the money is more akin to a
marketing budget than charitable donations. Congress should also create a
public-private entity responsible for developing and enforcing standards for
commercial support that are stricter than the ACCME's standards. This
entity would also be in charge of ensuring that CME topics fill quality gaps,
as well as locating alternative and more permanent sources of funding.
Finally, Congress should consider adopting a CME tax to raise funds for
CME activities in lieu of the current structure obtaining commercial
support. Because CME and industry have become so intertwined over the
past several decades, any solution to reduce or eliminate industry bias will
involve a fundamental restructuring of the way CME is created, funded, and
maintained. Avoiding the problem because the reforms required are too
drastic is not a sufficient reason to let the current regulatory regime
continue at the cost of quality patient care.
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